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Comment
Accommodating Religion in the
Public Schools
I. INTRODUCTION
Religion and the American experience are inextricably inter-
twined. Indeed, "[w ] e are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to wor-
ship as one chooses."' Nevertheless, a hallmark of our system is
the concept of separation between church and state-a concept
based upon "the belief that a union of government and religion
tends to destroy government and to degrade religion."2 The
maintainance of a complete separation between church and state,
however, has become increasingly difficult as the level of govern-
mental involvement in the lives of its citizens has become more
pervasive.3
One area of government involvement is mandatory elementary
and secondary public education.4 In the context of education, the
courts have been given frequent opportunities to define the bound-
1. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
2. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). Accord, Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 59 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("we have staked the very exist-
ence of our country on the faith that complete separation between state and
religion is best for the state and best for religion").
3. See Toms & Whitehead, The Religious Student in Public Education: Resolv-
ing a Constitutional Dilemma, 27 EMORY L.J. 3, 4 (1978).
4. For the purposes of this comment, references to "public schools," "public ed-
ucation," and the like refer only to the elementary and secondary levels. The
application of the Constitution is much different at the post-secondary level.
See Michaelsen, The Supreme Court and Religion in Public High Education,
13 J. PuB. L 343, 345 (1964):
Enge, Schempp, and such other church-state-education cases... in-
volved children in elementary or secondary schools, i.e., at a different
age level than students in public higher education. Students in ele-
mentary and secondary schools come under compulsory school at-
tendance laws whereas these laws do not apply to students in public
higher education. Furthermore, there is an obvious difference in ma-
turity level between a student in the eighth or ninth grade, for exam-
ple, and a college or university student. Such factors as differences
in age and maturity level could be of considerable importance in de-
termining the constitutionality of some practice at the higher educa-
tion level.
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aries of the wall separating church and state,5 and have concluded
that absolute separation is neither possible nor appropriate, since
it would deprive individuals of their right to "religious exercise...
without interference. '6 Thus, religion must be allowed to have
some role in public education.7
The role of religion in public education is not entirely clear. No-
tably, the separation principle is given a particularly strong em-
phasis in the context of education because children are immature,
impressionable, and easily pressured into altering their conduct.8
5. For religion cases in the United States Supreme Court dealing with elemen-
tary and secondary public education, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
6. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970); L. TRIBE, AmERICAN CON-
sTrruroNAL LAW 820 (1978) ("the principle evoked by the image of a wall fur-
nishes less guidance than metaphor").
7. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952):
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with
religious authorities. . . , it follows the best of our traditions. For it
then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates
the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not
would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the govern-
ment show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be
preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring):
The fact is that, for good or for ill, nearly everything in our culture
worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is satu-
rated with religious influences, derived from paganism, Judaism,
Christianity-both Catholic and Protestant-and other faiths ac-
cepted by a large part of the world's peoples. One can hardly respect
a system of education that would leave the student wholly ignorant
of the currents of religious thought that move the world society for a
part in which he is being prepared.
8. See Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court, 61 MIcH. L. REv.
1031, 1046 (1963). The United States Supreme Court explained the basis for
emphasizing the separation principle in McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 216-17 (1948):
The non-sectarian or secular public school was the means of recon-
ciling freedom in general with religious freedom. The sharp confine-
ment of the public schools to secular education was a recognition of
the need of a democratic society to educate its children, insofar as
the State undertook to do so, in an atmosphere free from pressures
in a realm in which pressures are most resisted and where conflicts
are most easily and most bitterly engendered. Designed to serve as
perhaps the most powerful agent for promoting cohesion among a
heterogeneous democratic people, the public school must keep scru-
pulously free from entanglement in the strife of sects. The preserva-
tion of the community from divisive conflicts, of Government from
irreconcilable pressures by religious groups, of religion from censor-
ship and coersion however subtly exercised, requires strict confine-
ment of the State to instruction other than religious, leaving to the
individual's church and home, indoctrination in the faith of his
choice.
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Illustrating this is the ruling that, although a chaplain may speak
to and pray before the United States Congress,9 the same remarks
by the chaplain may not be read verbatim at a public school assem-
bly.10 Nevertheless, a number of practices may be utilized by
which the rights of individuals to freely exercise their religion may
be accommodated in public schools.
The purpose of this comment is to examine areas of acceptable
accommodation of religion within the public schools." Incorpo-
rated within are the results of a survey of Nebraska public school
superintendents designed to discover the practices of the various
schools regarding accommodation of religion.12
H. THE LEGAL BACKDROP
A. Separation of Church and State
[T]he First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and
government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free
from the other within its respective sphere. Or, as we said in the Everson
case, the First Amendment has erected a wall between Church and State
which must be kept high and impregnable. 13
The concept of separation between church and state has had a
Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 23-24
(1947), explained further that public schools are organized
on the premise that secular education can be isolated from all reli-
gious teaching so that the school can inculcate all needed temporal
knowledge and also maintain a strict and lofty neutrality as to reli-
gion. The assumption is that after the individual has been instructed
in worldly wisdom he will be better fitted to choose his religion.
9. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) ("Prayers in our legislative halls"
do not violate the constitution).
10. See State Board of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 108 N.J. Super. 564, 582-85, 262
A.2d 21, 31-32, affd, 57 NJ. 172, 270 A.2d 412 (1970).
11. This comment does not deal with topics such as released time, which involves
an accommodation that occurs off the school premises or excusing a student
from activities that the student finds religiously objectionable, which raises
no direct establishment clause issues (see Vaugn v. Reed, 313 F. Supp. 431,
433-34 (W.D. Va. 1970)).
12. A questionnaire was sent to the superintendent of each Nebraska school dis-
trict listed as a Class 3 (Districts of 1,000 to 50,000 population, maintaining
both elementary and high school education) or Class 6 (Districts organized to
maintain high school education only) school district in the NEBRASKA STATE
DEP'T OF EDUCATION, EIGHTY-FIRST NEBRASKA EDUCATION DIRECTORY 130-37
(1978-1979). Each superintendent was asked to complete the questionnaire
by indicating his/her opinion as to the practices and policies that exist in the
school district for which he/she works. Of the 235 questionnaires distributed,
206 were completed and returned.
13. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,212 (1948). The separation principle
is based upon the establishment clause to the first amendment which states:




long and complex development in this country. It arose primarily
from the persecution of religious groups during the centuries im-
mediately preceding and contemporaneous with the colonization
of America. 14 During these centuries, dominant religious groups
utilized the power of the government to maintain their supremacy.
This union of church and state resulted in religious persecutions of
minority sects by the government, bloody religious wars, conflicts
between the papacy and monarchies, and all kinds of corruption in
both the church and state.'5
The religious cruelties and lack of religious freedoms that ex-
isted in the Old World provided a primary impetus for the migra-
tion to the New World.16 When the minority sects arrived in the
New World and found themselves in a position of dominance,
14. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9 (1947); A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER,
CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1964).
15. Sky, The Establishment Clause, the Congress and the Schools: An Historical
Perspective, 52 VA. L. REv. 1395, 1404-05 (1966). The United States Supreme
Court has described the situation as follows:
With the power of government supporting them, at various times and
places, Catholics had persecuted Protestants, Protestants had perse-
cuted Catholics, Protestant sects had persecuted other Protestant
sects, Catholics of one shade of belief had persecuted Catholics of
another shade of belief, and all of these had from time to time perse-
cuted Jews. In efforts to force loyalty to whatever religious group
happened to be on top and in league with the government of a partic-
ular time and place, men and women had been fined, cast in jail, cru-
elly tortured, and killed. Among the offenses for which these
punishments had been inflicted were such things as speaking disre-
spectfully of the views of ministers of government-established
churches, non-attendance at those churches, expressions of non-be-
lief in their doctrine, and failure to pay taxes and tithes to support
them.
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9 (1964).
16. There were undoubtedly many factors which encouraged early
American settlement. Some modern historians have emphasized the
economic note, that is, the colonists' desire for improving financial
conditions, and especially for securing land of their own. Others
have been impressed with the struggle for national ascendance in
America because of its effect on the balance of power in Europe, es-
pecially the curbing of Catholic Spain and France-a movement en-
couraged by the British government. Still others call attention to the
desire of large groups of middle-class people to get away from con-
servative restraints and to improve their social status by leaving
countries where class lines were still fairly rigid. The reasons for
making the long journey were indeed many and varied. Some
Europeans yielded to their love of change and adventure, generally
because a new world meant to them a new economic opportunity
(available good land in the old countries was scarce); some hoped to
escape political oppression, including some of the burdens of sup-
porting reactionary governments in the old lands, with heavy taxes,
military service, and other obligations.
These and other factors, social, economic, political, all played
their part. Yet the fact remains that the religious factor, at one time
[Vol. 59:425
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many of them could not resist the temptation to set up their own
systems of church-state integration.17 Thus, many of the Old
World practices and persecutions were revived in America. 18 A
few groups, nevertheless, withstood the temptation to repeat his-
tory and adopted declarations of religious toleration. Among these
groups were those who had been the objects of the most severe
persecutions in the Old World.19 This experience of the early colo-
nies both with and without an established state religion was a
prime factor in the eventual acceptance of the separation principle
as the touchstone for church-state relations in the United States.20
Passage of time in the early colonies saw the rise of dissention
and bitter public struggles concerning established state
churches. 2' The unrest was accompanied by a diminished devo-
tion among the populace toward the established church.22 These
effects resulted from the migration of a varied and independent
people to the New World. Prior to the migration, these people gen-
erally had been political liberals and religious non-conformists.2 3
Indeed, they were a people with a reputation for bucking the estab-
lishment. It is not surprising, therefore, that religious uniformity
and religious conformity compelled by the state authority did not
blossom in the colonies. These dissentions and struggles gave rise
to "the conviction that individual religious liberty could be
achieved best under a government which was stripped of all power
to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to
interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or group."24
so exclusively emphasized and so exaggerated as to produce a reac-
tion, is beginning again to receive due attention.
A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, supra note 14, at 21.
17. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9 (1964); Sky, supra note 15, at 1404-
05.
18. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1964).
19. Sky, supra note 15, at 1405. These groups included Rhode Island under Roger
Williams, William Penn's Pennsylvania with Quaker origins, and Catholic
Maryland.
20. A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, supra note 14, at 24. "These practices [persecutions,
obnoxious practices of dominant sects, and the imposition of taxes to support
dominant sects] became so commonplace as to shock the freedom-loving
colonials into a feeling of abhorence... [and] aroused their indignation. It
was these feelings which found expression in the First Amendment."
21. Id.
22. Id. at 23.
23. Id. at 22.
24. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947). This link between religious
diversity and religious toleration was observed by Voltaire. He wrote: "If
there were one religion in England, its despotism would be terrible; if there
were only two, they would destroy each other; but there are thirty, and there-
fore they live in peace and happiness." A. STOKES & L PFEFFER, supra note




Today, many Americans assume that a well-defined line of sep-
aration has been drawn between church and state in the United
States.25 Such an assumption is not entirely correct. Granted,
"[t]here cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment
reflects the philosophy that Church and State should be sepa-
rated .... The First Amendment within the scope of its coverage
permits no exception; the prohibition is absolute. ' 26 However, the
aura of finality and clarity that emanates from this statement is
deceiving. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has stated
that:
Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and
state; total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relation-
ship between government and religious organizations is inevitable....
Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that the line of sep-
aration, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred,,indistinct, and variable barrier
depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.
2 7
The various courts in the United States have had frequent oppor-
tunities to apply the separation principle to a wide variety of fact
situations.
As the courts have struggled to properly apply the separation
principle, a tripartite test has emerged as the guide for distinguish-
ing appropriate from inappropriate interminglings of church and
state. The three criteria necessary for a religious act in school to
be in accordance with the separation principle are: (1) the statute
or practice must have a secular purpose; (2) the primary effect of
the statute or practice must be one that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion; and (3) the statute or practice must not foster ex-
cessive governmental entanglement with religion.28
25. 0. ZABEL, GOD AND CAESAR IN NEBRASKA 1 (1955).
26. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
27. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). The separation principle, how-
ever, does mean at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or pre-
fer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a per-
son to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or in-
stitutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1964).
28. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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B. Free Exercise of Religion
The United States Constitution provides that: "Congress shall
make no law... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]."29 The
free exercise of religion and separation principles developed con-
currently and arose from the same historical backdrop. They de-
veloped as companion principles for the purpose of gaining the
fullest realization of religious liberty.3 0 While the separation prin-
ciple was designed to prevent state involvement with religion,3 1
the free exercise principle was designed to prevent religious coer-
cion by the state.32
The right of free exercise is said to be founded upon the princi-
ple that the seat of religious belief is the individual heart and
mind-a citadel which cannot be invaded by the power of govern-
ment.33 Thus, religious beliefs are entirely exempt from govern-
mental regulation.3 4 Only religious acts can be regulated by the
government. Acts, however, cannot be regulated indiscriminately.
Only when "[state] interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served" are at stake can the right of free exercise be
overbalanced.3 5 These state interests comprise a very limited
class of interests. Consequently, free exercise claims have been
overbalanced in decisions by the United States Supreme Court
only when the challenged exercise posed a substantial threat to
public health, safety, peace or order.36 In spite of this belief-act-
dichotomy, some areas of conduct are completely exempt from
governmental control under the free exercise clause.37
Although the free exercise principle was designed to comple-
ment the separation principle, the two often clash with each
other.38 The clash has resulted in the development of a "benevo-
29. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 232, 305 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring and Goldberg, J., concurring).
31. "Sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity" are the evils intended to be prevented by the free exercise
clause. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971).
32. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963).
33. Id. at 226.
34. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303 (1940).
35. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
36. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); Cleveland v. United States, 329
U.S. 14 (1946); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Jacobsen v. Mas-
sachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
37. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding right to refrain from send-
ing children to public schools). This rule is due in part to the fact that in
certain contexts "belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight
compartments." Id. at 220.
38. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970); L. TaRME, supra note 6, at 815.
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lent neutrality"3 9 or "wholesome 'neutrality' -40 concept. This con-
cept permits the accommodation of religion by the state and
prohibits state manifestations of hostility toward religion.4 1
I. SECULAR RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION
A. Instruction in General
The most direct means of accommodating religion in public ed-
ucation is secular instruction. In Abington School District v.
Schempp 42 the United States Supreme Court struck down a statu-
torily mandated 43 practice of reading from the Bible during the
school day. In so holding, however, the court stated that "one's ed-
ucation is not complete without a study of comparative religion or
the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of
civilization"'44 and "the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and
historic qualities. '4 5 The Court then declared that education in-
volving religious subject matters and texts can occur in the public
schools without violating the constitution.4 Thus, from Abington
we have two principles-one prohibiting religious exercises and
the other permitting the instructional use of religious materials.
The distinction between the two principles involves the degree of
objectivity involved in the presentation of religion. In Abington
the Court stated that:
Nothing we have said here indicates that... [the] study of the Bible or of
religion, when presented objectively as a part of a secular program of edu-
cation, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment. But
the exercises here do not fall into those categories. They are religious ex-
ercises, required by the States in violation of the command of the First
Amendment that the Government maintain strict neutrality, neither aid-
ing nor opposing religion.
4 7
Thus, objective religious instruction is constitutionally appropri-
ate, whereas anything amounting to a religious exercise in the
public schools is constitutionally prohibited.
The practical problem presented to educators who wish to
39. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970); L. TRMBE, supra note 6, at 815.
40. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); L. TRIBE, supra
note 6, at 815.
41. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306-07 (1963) (Goldberg,
J., concurring); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1948).
42. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
43. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 15-1516: "At least ten verses from the Holy Bible
shall be read without comment, at the opening of each public school on each
school day. Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending
such Bible reading, upon the written request of his parent or guardian."
44. 374 U.S. at 225.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (emphasis added).
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teach religion is to insure that the subject matter is presented ob-
jectively and that the presentation does not constitute a religious
exercise. Some judicial assistance has been offered in this regard
by Vaughn v. Reed 48 in which the court offered four guidelines by
which to judge the objectivity of religious training.
First, the objectives of the religious instruction must be secu-
lar.49 Vaughn involved the constitutionality of a religious educa-
tion program in an elementary public school. The court found the
following statement of objectives and purposes, given by one of the
religion teachers, to be secular and quite appropriate:
[T]he purpose of... [the religious instruction] is the same purpose as
my teaching. To help the boys and girls understand the Bible. We have
the feeling that in order to understand the country in which we live, the
democracy, and to understand our western civilization, to understand our
own culture, [to] understand the art you see by the great artists, [to] un-
derstand the music of today, one has to know something about the back-
ground of the Bible or these things have very little meaning, and we feel
like it's important that we give them. We're not trying to convert them to
religion, if that's what you mean. We're just trying to help them under-
stand today's civilization. 5 0
Second, proper objectives must be accompanied by appropriate
practices.5 1 In Vaughn the court stated that any practice amount-
ing to "the indoctrination or practice of religion" must be scrupu-
lously avoided5 2 If teaching practices are subject to legitimate
criticism in this regard, the practices lack the objectivity required
to pass constitutional muster.53 The third guideline involves the
use of a policy whereby a student is allowed to leave the classroom
during instruction about religion. The Vaughn court suggested
48. 313 F. Supp. 431 (W.D. Va. 1970).
49. Id. at 434 & n.2.
50. Id. at 434 n.2.
51. Although the Vaughn court found the stated objectives of the religious in-
struction to be appropriate, it found that certain actions amounted to the
practice of religion and were therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 433 & n.1.
52. Id. at 434.
53. Id. Examples of situations that constitute indoctrination or practice of reli-
gion in public schools can be found in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 372
U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading, without comment, at the beginning of each
school day); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (a non-denominational prayer
written by state authorities to be recited every day by public school stu-
dents); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (religious instruction
in public schools by teachers employed by a private, interdenominational re-
ligious group, subject to the approval and supervision of the superintendent
of the public schools); Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965) (student-
initiated oral prayers in public school); Goodwin v. Cross County School Dist.
No. 7, 394 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (Bible verses and Lord's Prayer re-
cited by school student council members as part of school's opening exer-
cises); American Civil Liberties Union v. Albert Gallatin Area School Dist.,
307 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Pa. 1969) (Bible reading and recitation of Lord's Prayer
during school time encouraged by school board).
1980]
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that such a policy, although it does not ordinarily raise constitu-
tional questions, indicates that a constitutionally questionable
course of teaching exists:54 "If the course is being properly taught
within the constitutional limits, there is no reason for non-attend-
ance by any student."55
The final guideline offered in Vaughn is derived from a unique
factual situation at issue in the case. The teachers in the Vaughn
situation, who were sent to the public schools for the purpose of
teaching about religion, were hired, not by the local school board,
but by the Week-Day Religious Education Council-a private or-
ganization. 56 Thus, control over the religious education program
rested, not with the public school, but with the private organiza-
tion.57 The court held that "[the better procedure would be for
the school board to hire and control the teacher."5 8 The court has-
tened to add, however, that "special teachers" may be hired for re-
ligious instruction and that the courts are not empowered to
dictate the qualifications that a teacher must possess. 59
Additional guidance regarding the objectivity of religious in-
struction was offered in Reed v. Van Hoven.60 The Reed court indi-
cated that certain materials of a religious nature could be read
ceremonially in the public schools without violating the Constitu-
tion. These permissible materials are those that offer "lessons in
the impact of religion upon the men who were leaders of our na-
tion, and in turn, through them, upon the nation's affairs and his-
tory."6 1 They may include statements regarding such things as the
essentially religious character of our nation, the belief in a
supreme being, and the belief that the rights of man originated
54. 313 F. Supp. at 433-34.
55. Id. at 434. The Vaughn court also stated:
If the course is taught within constitutional limits, every student
should be required to attend. If the course is necessary to the educa-
tion of one child, it is equally necessary to the education of all stu-
dents. The controversial nature of a course should not be grounds
for dismissing a student from its study. Once the school board deter-
mines that a particular course should be taught in the schools, the
court sees no justification for allowing a student or his parents to de-
cide that the student will not attend.
Id. at 433-34. Compare id. with Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1972)
(a school cannot require a student to participate in a Reserve Officer Training
Corps program that is contrary to the student's religious beliefs as a consci-
entious objector).
56. 313 F. Supp. at 432.
57. See id. at 434.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965).
61. Id. at 55.
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with the supreme being.62 Examples given by the Reed court 63
are: (1) the Declaration of Independence;64 (2) speeches by Presi-
dents, 65 e.g., Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, 66 Lincoln's inaugural
address, 67 and addresses by John F. Kennedy;68 (3) statements
62. Id.
63. See id. at 55-56.
64. When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one
people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them
with another, and to assume among the Powers of the earth, the sep-
arate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's
God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind re-
quires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the
separation .... We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with cer-
tain unalienable rights.
Quoted in id. at 55-56 n.9.
65. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 446-48 n.3 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
66. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining for
us that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to the
cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion; that we
here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that
this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom, and that
the government of the people, by the people, and for the people shall
not perish from the earth.
W. STODDARD, ABRAHAM LINcom: THE TRuE STORY OF A GREAT LIFE 413
(1885).
67. Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of
war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until
all the wealth piled by the bondsman's two hundred and fifty years of
unrequited toil shall be sunk and until every drop of blood drawn
with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was
said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said 'the judgments
of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.'
With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the
right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the
work we are in, to bind up the nation's wounds, to care for him who
shall have borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan, to do
all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among
ourselves and with all nations.
Inaugural address of President Abraham Lincoln (Mar. 4, 1865) (quoted in
237 F. Supp. at 55 n.7).
68. "[T]he same revolutionary beliefs for which our forebears fought are still at
issue around the globe-the belief that the rights of man come not from the
generosity of the state but from the hand of God." Inaugural address of Pres-
ident John F. Kennedy (Jan. 20, 1961) (quoted in 237 F. Supp. at 56 n.9).
We in this country, in this generation, are, by destiny rather than
choice, the watchmen on the walls of world freedom. We ask, there-
fore, that we may be worthy of our power and responsibility, that we
may exercise our strength with wisdom and restraint, and that we
may achieve in our time and for all time the ancient vision of 'peace
on earth, good will toward men.' That must always be our goal-and
the righteousness of our cause must always underlie our strength.
For as was written long ago: 'Except the Lord keep the city, the
watchman waketh but in vain.'
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about religion by the United States Supreme Court;6 9 and (4) the
Northwest Territory Ordinance.7 0
An example of judicially approved guidelines for secular reli-
gious instruction can be found in Florey v. Sioux Falls School Dis-
trict.71 The Florey guidelines were an application of the policy
stated by the local school district that no religious belief or non-
belief should be promoted or disparaged by the school district, that
toleration and acceptance of differing religious views should be en-
couraged, and that the school district should give the students an
awareness of the role that religion has played in the development
of our nation.7 2 In applying this policy the guidelines directed that:
Address of President John F. Kennedy (Dallas, Texas, Nov. 22, 1963) (quoted
in 237 F. Supp. at 56 n.9).
"With a good conscience our only sure reward, with history the final judge
of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love, asking His blessing and
His help, but knowing that here on earth God's work must truly be our own."
Inaugural address of President John F. Kennedy (Jan. 20, 1961) (quoted in id.
at 55 n.7).
69. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213 (1963):
It can be truly said, therefore, that today, as in the beginning, our
national life reflects a religious people. . . . 'The place of religion in
our society is an exalted one, achieved through a long tradition of
reliance on the home the church and the inviolable citadel of the in-
dividual heart and mind.'
Id. at 226.
70. Art. L No person, demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly
manner shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship or
religious sentiments, in the said territory.
Art. IIl. Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to
good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the
means of education shall forever be encouraged.
1 Stat. 51 (July 13, 1787) (quoted at id.).
71. 464 F. Supp. 911 (D.S.D. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1277 (8th Cir. 1979).
72. Id. at 918. This statement of policy reads in full:
Recognition of Religious Beliefs and Customs
It is accepted that no religious belief or non-belief should be pro-
moted by the school district or its employees, and none should be
disparaged. Instead, the school district should encourage all stu-
dents and staff members to appreciate and be tolerant of each other's
religious views. The school district should utilize its opportunity to
foster understanding and mutual respect among students and par-
ents, whether it involves race, culture, economic background or reli-
gious beliefs. In that spirit of tolerance, students and staff members
should be excused from participating in practices which are contrary
to their religious beliefs unless there are clear issues of overriding
concern that would prevent it.
The Sioux Falls School District recognizes that one of its educa-
tional goals is to advance the students' knowledge and appreciation
of the role that our religious heritage has played in the social, cul-
tural and historical development of civilization.
Religious institutions and orientations are central to human expe-
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[T]he practice of the Sioux Falls School District shall be as follows:
1. The District supports the inclusion of religious literature, music,
drama and the arts in the curriculum and in school activities provided
it is intrinsic to the learning experience in the various fields of study
and is presented objectively.
2. The emphasis on religious themes in the arts, literature and history
should be only as extensive as necessary for a balanced and compre-
hensive study of these areas. Such studies should never foster any
particular religious tenets or demean any religious beliefs.
3. Student-initiated expressions to questions or assignments which re-
flect their beliefs or non-beliefs about a religious theme shall be ac-
commodated. For example, students are free to express religious
belief or non-belief in compositions, art forms, music, speech and de-
bate.7 3
These guidelines were developed by a citizens' committee which
had been established by the District 49-5 School Board for the pur-
pose of studying church-state relations in the public schools and
were then adopted by the School Board. The plaintiffs in Florey
filed suit seeking injunctive relief and a declaration that the guide-
lines were unconstitutional.7 4 The court denied the plaintiffs' re-
quest.7 5 The guidelines, therefore, provide valuable and practical
assistance in assuring that particular practices of instruction about
religion in public schools pass constitutional muster.
Objective instruction about religion provides a direct means of
accommodating religion in public schools. The questionnaire sent
to superintendents of various Nebraska school districts7 6 inquired
about the extent of objective instruction about religion in Ne-
braska schools. 77 Of the 206 superintendents responding to this in-
quiry, 111 indicated that little, if any, such instruction occurs in
their school districts, ninety-four indicated that moderate quanti-
ties of such instruction occurs, and only one superintendent indi-
cated that a substantial portion of time is devoted toward objective
teaching about religion.
rience, past and present. An education excluding such a significant
aspect would be incomplete. It is essential that the teaching about-
and not of-religion be conducted in a factual objective and respect-
ful manner.
Id.
73. Id. at 918-19.
74. Id. at 913.
75. Id. at 918.
76. See note 12 & accompanying text supra.
77. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the objective
teaching of religion (e.g., from a standpoint of literature, history, or
comparative study) is constitutionally proper. Does your school sys-
tem participate in such objective teaching about religion?
a. Little if any such teaching occurs
b. Moderate quantities of such teaching occurs




An application of the objective religious instruction rationale
has been used to uphold the prudent use of religious music, art,
literature, drama, and symbols in public schools. In Florey78 the
plaintiffs unsuccessfully attacked a set of public school guidelines
which encouraged the study of religious beliefs and customs in the
public schools.7 9 Although directed against the entire set of guide-
lines 80 the attack centered on the rules regarding observance of
religious holidays.8 1 The plaintiffs demanded a ruling "that all
Christmas assemblies must be absolutely and irrevocably secu-
lar. '82 The court, however, upheld the guidelines 83 and gave a
thoughtful and thorough analysis of the situation.
The Florey court observed that the indiscriminate observance
of any and every religious holiday had not been prescribed by the
guidelines. Instead the guidelines had mandated that only those
holidays be observed which have both a religious and secular sig-
nificance (e.g., Christmas and Easter).84 Excluded from an observ-
able status in public schools, therefore, were such holidays as
Pentacost, Ash Wednesday, and Good Friday.8 5 The court found
78. 464 F. Supp. 911 (D.S.D. 1979), appeal docketed No. 79-1277 (8th Cir. 1979).
79. See notes 60-75 & accompanying text supra.
80. 464 F. Supp. 911, 918-19.
81. The guidelines regarding religious holidays read in full:
Observance of Religious Holidays
The practice of the Sioux Falls School District shall be as follows:
1. The several holidays throughout the year which have a religious
and a secular basis may be observed in the public schools.
2. The historical and contemporary values and the origin of reli-
gious holidays may be explained in an unbiased and objective
manner without sectarian indoctrination.
3. Music, art, literature and drama having religious themes or basis
are permitted as part of the curriculum for school-sponsored ac-
tivities and programs if presented in a prudent and objective
manner and as a traditional part of the cultural and religious heri-
tage of the particular holiday.
4. The use of religious symbols such as a cross, menorah, crescent,
Star of David, creche, symbols of Native American religions or
other symbols that are a part of a religious holiday is permitted as
a teaching aid or resource provided such symbols are displayed
as an example of the cultural and religious heritage of the holiday
and are temporary in nature. Among these holidays are included
Christmas, Easter, Passover, Hannukah, St. Valentine's Day, St.
Patrick's Day, Thanksgiving and Halloween.
5. The school district's calendar should be prepared so as to mini-
mize conflicts with religious holidays of all faiths.
Id.
82. Id. at 913.
83. Id. at 918.
84. Id. at 915.
85. Id.
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this limitation to be very important in removing constitutional ob-
jections from the religious holiday observance guidelines.8 6
The Florey court utilized the well-established tripartite test in
analyzing the constitutionality of the guidlines: namely, that to
pass muster, the situation (1) must reflect a clearly secular legisla-
tive purpose- (2) must have a primary effect that neither advances
or inhibits religion; and (3) must avoid excessive governmental en-
tanglement with religion.87 Regarding the first part of the test, the
court observed that the guidelines require that any presentation of
religious art, literature, or music at religious holiday observances
in the public school be cloaked with objectivity and prudence.88
This requirement led the court to determine that "[t] he purpose of
the ... [instruction] is to expose and involve the student in the
full spectrum of our Western musical tradition," rather than to pro-
mote the Christian religion.89 Moreover, the court found that the
reason behind adopting the guidelines was to "guide school per-
sonnel in chartering a constitutionally valid course in this sensitive
area."90 Consequently, the purpose of the study was found to be
secular.
Regarding the second part of the test, the statement of Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson in McCollum v. Board of Education is apropos: "Mu-
sic without sacred music, architecture minus the cathedral, or
painting without the scriptural themes would be eccentric and in-
complete, even from a secular point of view."9 1 Therefore, to allow
the objective, educational use of materials having a religious sig-
nificance in public school holiday observances is not only proper,
but a contrary rule "would leave the schools in the position of only
being permitted to present programs that are eccentric and incom-
plete" 92 and would have the effect of demonstrating a hostility to-
ward religion.93 Thus, the Florey court found the primary effect of
the guidelines to be secular and not promotive or inhibitive of reli-
gion;9 4 therefore, the guidelines were valid under the second part
of the tripartite test.
In its analysis of the guidelines under the second part of the
tripartite test, the Florey court focused primarily on rule four 95 of
86. Id.
87. See Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
772-73 (1973).
88. 464 F. Supp. at 915.
89. Id. at 916.
90. Id.
91. 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
92. 464 F. Supp. at 916.
93. Id. at 917.
94. Id. at 916.
95. See note 81 supra.
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the religious holiday observance guidelines. Rule four provided
that religious symbols, such as a cross, menorah, crescent, Star of
David, or creche, could be used in the observance of religious holi-
days. According to rule four, any display of such symbols had to
have a teaching function-providing examples of the cultural and
religious heritage of the holiday-and had to be temporary in na-
ture. The holding that rule four had a secular purpose and an ef-
fect that did not promote religion 96 finds support in Lawrence v.
Buchmueler9W which permitted the erection of a nativity scene on
public school premises during the Christmas school recess. The
Lawrence court reasoned that a contrary ruling would
be tantamount to sanctioning judicially a policy of nonrecognition of God
in the public schools resulting in a denial that religion has played any part
in the formulation of the moral standards of the community. In such cir-
cumstances the State's declared purpose of fostering in the children of the
State 'moral and intellectual qualities,' would be thwarted.9 8
Under the third portion of the tripartite test, the Florey court
concluded that the policy, rules, and implementation of the guide-
lines did not "result in any particular relationship between the
school and any religious authority."99 In arriving at this conclu-
sion, the court granted that (1) "an individual's religious sensibili-
ties might possibly be kindled by participating in a school
Christmas assembly in which songs with religious texts are
sung";' 0 (2) "[t] he school cannot guarantee that exposure to vari-
ous religions and religious ideas will not aid religion in some
cases";1 01 and (3) the school cannot guarantee that the application
of the guidelines will not provide a religious sect with a convert. 10 2
Nevertheless, the court declared that any prediction that a benefit
would accrue to any religion through the implementation of the
96. 464 F. Supp. at 916-17.
97. 40 Misc. 2d 300, 243 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1963). For other cases allowing the erection
of religious symbols on public property, see Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1973) (monument inscribed with Ten Commandments
on courthouse grounds); Allen v. Morton, 161 U.S. App. D.C. 239, 495 F.2d 65
(1973) (nativity scene in federal park adjacent to White House during Christ-
mas season); Paul v. Dade County, 202 So.2d 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1041 (1968) (lights in shape of Latin cross on courthouse dur-
ing Christmas season); Opinions of the Justices, 108 N.H. 97, 228 A.2d 161
(1967) (plaques with the words "In God We Trust" in public schoolrooms);
Meyer v. Oklahoma City, 496 P.2d 789 (Okla.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 980 (1972)
(50 foot permanent Latin cross, sponsored by Council of Churches). Contra,
Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867, 587 P.2d 663 (1978) (display of
huge cross on city hall during Christmas and Easter seasons struck down
under California Constitution).
98. 40 Misc. 2d at 300, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
99. 464 F. Supp. at 918.
100. Id. at 917.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 918.
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guidelines would be highly speculative. 03 Therefore, the guide-
lines were found to involve no excessive entanglement between
government and religion 104 and to withstand all the demands of
the tripartate test. It should be emphasized, however, that al-
though the guidelines permitted the use in holiday observances of
music, art, literature and drama having religious content, they al-
lowed only the objective use of such materials. 05 The Florey court
emphasized at the beginning of its analysis that a certain kinder-
garten Christmas program presented in 1977 violated the constitu-
tion for the very reason that it lacked objectivity. The
unconstitutional kindergarten program included the following re-
sponsive discourse entitled "The Beginners Christmas Quiz:"
Teacher. Of whom did heav'nly angels sing,
And news about His birthday bring?
Class: Jesus.
Teacher. Now, can you name the little town
Where they the Baby Jesus found?
Class: Bethlehem.
Teacher- Where had they made a little bed
For Christ, the blessed Saviour's head?
Class: In a manger in a cattle stall.
Teacher: What is the day we celebrate
As birthday of this One so great?
Class: Christmas.106
Thus, Florey did not give a blanket provision for religious exer-
cises at Christmas time but provided only for objective, educa-
tional uses of religious materials.
According to the survey of Nebraska public school superintend-
ents, 107 holiday celebrations are a widely used means of accommo-
dating religion in Nebraska schools. One hundred fifty-nine of the
206 schools which responded provide some type of ceremonial ob-
servance of the Christmas holiday,108 and these observances gen-
erally involve the singing of such religious songs as "Silent Night,
Holy Night," and the display of such religious symbols as a nativity
scene or cross.109 Only forty-five superintendents responded with-
out qualification that no type of ceremonial holiday observance
was provided by the school system.
103. Id. at 917.
104. See id. at 917-18.
105. Id. at 914. See also text accompanying note 47 supra.
106. 464 F. Supp. at 912.
107. See note 12 & accompanying text supra.
108. The question eliciting this response reads as follows:
Does your school system provide for any type of ceremonial obser-
vance of the Christmas Holiday?
a. Yes
b. No
109. The question eliciting this response reads as follows:
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C. Theories of Origins
Public school instruction regarding the origins of mankind and
the environment has been the source of much controversy in
America. At the heart of the controversy has been the struggle for
supremacy between two basic theories. One theory, commonly re-
ferred to as evolution, holds that man developed from lower forms
of life in an environment that evolved through natural
processes." 0 The theory of divine creation, on the other hand,
holds that the universe, the earth, and all life, including mankind,
came into being by acts of God."' The controversy found its focal
point in the historic Scopes trial." 2 Prior to Scopes, the divine cre-
ation theory had been broadly accepted. To insure its continued
acceptance, the Tennessee Legislature had adopted the Anti-
Evolution Act," 3 which made the teaching of evolution in public
schools a crime." 4 John Thomas Scopes was convicted under the
Anti-Evolution Act and fined $100. On appeal, the lower court's
If you answered question number seven [see note 108 supra] "Yes,"
does this observance include any of the following practices:








In response to part a. of this question, 155 (of the 159 schools that provided
ceremonial observances) answered "Yes." In response to part b. of this ques-
tion, 101 (of the 159 schools that provide ceremonial observances) answered
"Yes."
110. See THE HARPER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE 425-27 (rev. ed. 1967); VAN NOS-
TRAND'S SCIENTIFIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 989 (5th Ed. 1976). According to Julian
Huxley, "[e]volution in the extended sense can be defined as a directional
and essentially irreversible process, occurring in time, which in its course
gives rise to an increase of variety and an increasingly high level of organiza-
tion in its products."; H. MORRIS, THE TROUBLED WATERS OF EVOLUTION 81
(1974). "Evolution comprises all the stages of the development of the uni-
verse: the cosmic, biological and human or cultural developments."
Dobzhansky, Changing Map, 155 SCIENCE 409, 409 (1967).
111. J. MOORE & H. SLUSHER, BIOLOGY: A SEARCH FOR ORDER IN COMPLEXrrY 555
(1974). Neither the divine creation view nor the evolutionary view are mono-
lithic. The specific details regarding each of the theories vary widely among
their respective adherents. See Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485, 491 (6th Cir.
1975); J. HUXLEY, EVOLUTION: THE MODERN SYNTHESIS 29-31 (1974); J. SAVAGE,
EVOLUTION iii-iv (3d ed. 1977).
112. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927).
113. 1925 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 27 at 50.
114. The Act reads in full:
An act prohibiting the teaching of the evolution theory in all the
Universities, normals and other public schools of Tennessee, which
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judgment was reversed, though not on first amendment grounds." 5
Since Scopes, the controversy has become primarily a first
amendment question due to the religious character of divine crea-
tion explanations." 6 One might argue that any religious element
inherent in the divine creation theory does not prevent a public
school teacher from teaching that God created all things. The rule
permitting objective teaching about religion" 7 permits a public
school teacher to objectively present a theory of divine creation
and its scientific basis" 8 to students in a public classroom. Great
care must be exercised by the teacher, however, to insure that the
instruction is objective.
In striving for objectivity, it may be necessary for a teacher to
fully present an evolutionary explanation of origins. The advisabil-
are supported in whole or in part by the public school funds of the
state, and to provide penalties for the violations thereof.
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the state of
Tennessee, that it shall be unlawful for any teacher in any of the Uni-
versities, normals and all other public schools of the state which are
supported in whole or in part by the public school funds of the state,
to teach any theory that denies the story of the divine creation of
man as taught in the Bible and to teach instead that man has de-
scended from a lower order of animals.
Section 2. Be it further enacted, that any teacher found guilty of
the violation of this act, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon
conviction shall be fined not less than one hundred ($100.00) dollars
nor more than five hundred ($500.00) dollars for each offense.
Section 3. Be it further enacted, that this act take effect from and
after its passage, the public welfare requiring it.
Id.
115. The court held that this Act did not violate the United States Constitution.
154 Tenn. at 111-12, 289 S.W. at 366, and that it did not violate Tennessee's
constitutional provision against preferring any religion. 154 Tenn. at 118-19,
289 S.W. at 366-67. The court's reversal was based upon the fact that, although
the jury had found Scopes guilty, it had been the trial judge who assessed the
fine: "Since a jury alone can impose the penalty this act requires, and as a
matter of course no different penalty can be inflicted, the trial judge exceeded
his jurisdiction in levying this fine, and we are without power to correct his
error. The judgment must accordingly be reversed." 154 Tenn. at 121, 289
S.W. at 367.
116. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d
485 (6th Cir. 1975); Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208
(S.D. Tex. 1972), affid per curiam, 480 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973).
117. See § Ill-A of text supra. Instruction about divine creation is covered by this
rule. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 206 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
118. Religious dogma is not the only foundation upon which a theory of divine
creation can be constructed. A number of textbooks, written by highly
trained scientists rather than theologians, employ scientific discussion rather
than religious dogma to present a theory of divine creation. Examples of
these textbooks are J. MOORE & H. SLusHER, supra note 111; OfiGrNs (R. Bliss
ed., Creation-Life Pub. 1976); THE SCmNCE AND CREATION SERIES (H. Morris &
J. Phelps eds., Creation-Science Research Center 1971).
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ity of this approach is manifested in Palmer v. Board of Education
of Chicago."9 Palmer involved an untenured kindergarten
teacher who, because of her religious beliefs, refused to follow the
curriculum prescribed by school authorities.120 The teacher
claimed that her refusal was appropriate under the free exercise
clause.' 2 ' The court ruled that the teacher had no constitutional
right to make such a refusal because the refusal would "deprive
her students of an elementary knowledge and appreciation of our
national heritage"' 2 2 and would provide only "a distorted view of
our country's history."'123 The court explained that "[pilaintiffs
right to her own religious views and practices remains unfettered,
but she has no constitutional right to require others to submit to
her views and to forgo a portion of their education they would
otherwise be entitled to enjoy.' 2 4
Presenting an evolutionary theory fully, however, does not
mean that a teacher is required to present it as truth or as a law of
science. Ideas about man's evolution from lower forms of life are
generally held to be theories only--not laws of science. 125 Cer-
tainly, a teacher has a free speech right to emphasize this fact to
students.126 A teacher should not be prohibited from presenting to
students alleged incompatibilities between certain scientific prin-
ciples and evolutionary theories. 127 Moreover, a teacher need not
119. 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979).
120. The teacher was a Johovah's Witness and had refused "to teach any subjects
having to do with love of country, the flag or other patriotic matters in the
prescribed curriculum." Id. at 1272. She considered that instruction and par-
ticipation in such matters promoted idolatry. Id. at 1274. The curriculum had
been prescribed by policies of the Board of Education and by directives from
the teacher's principal and other superiors. Id. at 1273-74. There was nothing
innovative or unique about this part of the prescribed curriculum-it was
traditional. Id. at 1274. Moreover, "[ejxtraordinary efforts were made to ac-
commodate plaintiffs religious beliefs at her particular school and elsewhere
in the system, but it could not reasonably be accomplished." Id. at 1272.
121. Id. at 1272.
122. Id. at 1274.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See EVOLUTION: PROCESS AND PRODUCT 431 (2d ed. E. Dodson & P. Dodson
1976); F. RACLE, INTRODUCTION TO EVOLUTION 2-3 (1979). However, many writ-
ers contend that there is no possibility that the evolution concept could be
erroneous. See, e.g., F. AYALA & J. VALENTINE, EVOLVING-THE THEORY &
PROCESSES OF ORGANIC EVOLUTION 1 (1979); J. SAVAGE, supra note 111, at iii.
126. See note 128 infra.
127. For example, evolutionary theories may be seen as inconsistent with the first
and second laws of thermodynamics. See J. WHITCOMB, JR. & H. MORRIS, THE
GENESIS FLOOD 222-27 (1961). Essentially, these two laws mean that "[i]n
any naturally occurring process, the tendency is for all systems to proceed
from order to disorder." Lindsay, Entropy Consumption and Values in Physi-
cal Science, 47 AMERICAN SCIENTIST 376, 382 (1959).
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feign a belief that an evolutionary explanation of origins accurately
explains reality: "[o]bviously, a teacher is not required to be com-
pletely neutral on all matters of intellectual or topical import."'128
Disparagements concerning an evolutionary view are, of course,
subject to the requirement that a divine creation view be
presented objectively.129 Disparagements are also subject to the
principle that a teacher's instruction may not arbitrarily inculcate
doctrinaire views in the minds of students or be coercive. 130
The preceding discussion assumes that instruction concerning
a divine creation view of origins is essentially religious in charac-
ter and therefore subject to the establishment clause of the Consti-
tution. Such an assumption, however, is not necessarily valid. A
strong argument can be made that the presentation of scientific ev-
idence for a divine creation theory does not violate the require-
ments of the establishment clause because it is not instruction in
religious material.131 Indeed, "[t]eachers of science in public
128. Note, Academic Freedom in the Public Schools: The Right to Teach, 48
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1176, 1193 (1973).
First amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics
of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It
can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their con-
stitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school-
house gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for
almost 50 years.
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). See also James v.
Board of Educ. of Central Dist. No. 1, 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
129. See § EII-A of text supra.
130. James v. Board of Educ. of Central Dist. No. 1, 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972): "Certainly there must be some restraints Iupon
the teacher's freedom of instruction] because the students are a 'captive'
group." This rule may also have some application in preventing a teacher's
instruction about evolution from being coercive.
131. See Bird, Freedom From Establishment and Unneutrality in Public School In-
struction and Religious School Regulation, 2 HRv. J.L. & PuB. PoL. 125,165-74
(1979).
The supranatural element of a creator in scientific creationism does
not cause that theory to be religious doctrine, as long as little empha-
sis is given to the identity of the creator just as the supranatural ele-
ment of the eternal existence of matter or of the teleology of natural
selection does not make the general theory of evolution religious.
And the impossibility of irrefutable scientific verification of the oc-
currence of creation or of experimental observation of the act of crea-
tion does not render scientific creationism a religious theory, just as
the impossibility of verification that evolution actually occurred or
observation of evolutionary events that predated man does not make
evolution a religious theory. While these factors do not render either
theory of origins religious in nature, they do show that both the gen-
eral theory of evolution and the theory of scientific creationism have
an element of unprovable faith or assumption and that both have im-
plications for religious belief.
Id. at 170 (footnotes omitted).
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schools should not be expected to avoid the discussion of every
scientific issue on which some religion claims expertise."'132
The survey 13 3 of Nebraska public school superintendents indi-
cates that many teachers in Nebraska schools are taking advan-
tage of the right to instruct students about divine creation views.
Of the 206 responses to the survey, 139 indicated that divine crea-
tion views were presented to students; 3 4 while only sixty-four re-
sponses indicated that little if any such teaching occurs.1 35
Decisions as to whether a divine creation view will be
presented to students are generally made by the individual teach-
ers. One hundred-eighty of the 206 survey responses indicated
that the discretion of each teacher is the controlling factor in this
matter.136 Only nineteen of the survey responses said that an ar-
ticulated policy of the school system controlled whether a divine
132. Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (S.D. Tex. 1972),
affid per curiam, 480 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973). This principle was articulated
by the court as a basis for rejecting the argument that restricting the study of
human origins to an uncritical examination of the theory of evolution violates
the establishment clause by lending official support to a religion of secular-
ism. The court explained that instruction concerning evolution is peripheral
to the matter of religion, id., and that any connection between evolution and
religion "is too tenuous a thread on which to base a First Amendment com-
plaint." Id. at 1210. By the same token, a creation theory based upon scien-
tific evidence is only peripherally related to religion and ought not be
classified as religious simply because the scientific reasoning led to conclu-
sions consistent with the conclusions of religious thought. Cf. Women's Serv.
v. Thone, 48 U.S.L.W. 2392 (D. Neb. 1979):
As long as the legislature bases its determination as to what fac-
tors amount to human life on considerations that are as capable of
being labled philosophical as religious, the Constitution does not re-
quire that the chosen set of factors be called religious or that a differ-
ent set of factors be chosen.
Id. at 2392 (quoting U.S.L.W. summary).
133. See note 12 & accompanying text supra.
134. The question eliciting information regarding theories of origins reads as fol-
lows:
Regarding the origins of man and his environment, does your school
system teach a divine creation theory?
a. Such a theory is not taught
b. Students are merely made aware of the existence and basic
tenets of such a theory
c. Such a theory is taught a legitimate and viable alternative to a
Darwinian theory of evolution.
Of the 139 responses indicating that a divine creation view is presented to
students, 119 indicated that students in their schools were merely made
aware of the existence and basic tenents of divine creation explanations,
while twenty indicated that divine creation was taught as a legitimate and
viable alternative to evolutionary explanations.
135. Three of the respondents did not answer this question.
136. The question eliciting this information reads as follows:
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creation view is presented to students.137
A number of cases have dealt with the right of public authori-
ties to set policy concerning the substantive content of instruction
about the origins of mankind and the environment.138 The effect of
these cases has been to severely limit the policy-making authority
of public officials in the origins instruction context. According to
these cases, a public authority may not: (1) prohibit the teaching of
a scientific theory;139 (2) penalize a teacher for instructing stu-
dents about an evolutionary theory;14 0 (3) prohibit the teaching of
an evolutionary theory as true-as scientific fact rather than mere
theory;14 1 (4) establish a policy of preference for a divine creation
view over an evolutionary view;142 or (5) establish a policy of pref-
erence for one religion's view of divine creation over another reli-
gion's view.143 Such limitations, although restrictive, do not
absolutely prohibit appropriate public authorities from setting pol-
icy regarding instruction about theories of origins. Indeed, it
would be anomalous to permit a teacher to teach about divine crea-
tion and evolution yet strip public authorities, who are responsible
for curriculum content, of any control over what is taught.144
A public school policy-making authority, therefore, desiring
that students be made aware of a divine creation theory might let
its will be known by issuing a very general, religiously neutral and
sanctionless policy statement that does not run afoul of the estab-
lishment clause. Such a policy might be stated as follows: "In-
struction on Origins of Man and the Environment-Since the
presentation of only an evolutionary theory in the classroom might
force some students to choose between their system of belief and
an evolutionary theory, classroom instruction should not be lim-
ited to evolutionary explanations.' 45 An appropriate policy-mak-
The practice indicated in your response to question number two
[concerning origins instruction, see note 134 supra] is the result of:
a. The discretion of individual teachers
b. An articulated policy of the school system.
137. On seven of the questionnaires, this question was not answered directly.
138. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d
485 (6th Cir. 1975); Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927).
139. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968). The Court suggested, however,
that this restriction applies only when the prohibition is based upon reasons
that violate the first amendment.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 102-03; Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485, 489 (6th Cir. 1975).
142. Id. at 489.
143. See Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (S.D. Tex.
1972), affd per curiam, 480 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973).
144. "[S]tates possess an undoubted right so long as not restrictive of constitu-
tional guarantees to prescribe the curriculum for their public schools." Ep-
person v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968).
145. This type of policy has been adopted by the California Board of Education
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ing authority might also make its will known by approving
textbooks containing a divine creation model.146 In light of the
teacher's right to present a creation viewpoint, 147 these religiously





In 1962, the United States Supreme Court made a controversial
ruling regarding prayer in public schools. 149 The case involved the
voluntary recitation of a prayer by students at the beginning of
each school day. The prayer was recited pursuant to a program
recommended by the State Board of Regents' 50 and adopted by
the Board of Education of a local school district. The prayer, com-
posed by the Board of Regents, was nondenominational and read
as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon
Thee, and we beg Thy blessing upon us, our parents, our teachers
and our Country."'15 1 The Court found that this religious exercise
in the public school violated the first amendment prohibition
against establishment of religion.15 2
One year later, the Court ruled upon another school prayer
case. That case, Abington School District v. Schempp,153 involved
recitations of the Lord's Prayer at the beginning of each public
school day. The Court struck down the Abington practice and
and by large school districts in Dallas, Texas; Columbus, Ohio; and Kanawha
County, West Virginia; as well as by the states of Arizona and Oregon. See
Note, Freedom of Religion and Science Instruction in Public Schools, 87 YALE
L.J. 515, 516-17 nn.4-8.
146. The states of Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Oklahoma, and Tennessee have added
to their approved list general textbooks or supplementary texts that present
a divine creation model. Id. at 517 n.9.
147. See notes 117-18 & accompanying text supra.
148. It must be noted, however, that a controversy does exist and that these ac-
tions have yet to be judicially approved. Nevertheless, these actions have
developed during the period of the controversy as appropriate accommoda-
tions in resolving the situation. Id. at 515-18.
149. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). For a discussion of various views repre-
sented in this controversy, see Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the
Supreme Court, 61 MIcH. L. REv. 1031, 1031-32 (1963).
150. The Board of Regents is "a governmental agency created by the State Consti-
tution to which the New York Legislature has granted broad supervisory, ex-
ecutive, and legislative powers over the State's public school system." Id. at
423.
151. Id. at 422.
152. Id. at 424.
153. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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thereby reaffirmed its earlier ruling in Engel.154
The negative response to the Engel and Abington decisions was
very strong. Proposals for changing the rule included such things
as disobedience,155 curtailing the power and jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court,5 6 impeaching the justices,5 7 and adopting a con-
stitutional amendment. 58 Nevertheless, the lower courts subse-
quently applied the Engel-Abington principle rather strictly. In
DeSpain v. DeKalb County Community School District,159 for ex-
ample, a kindergarten teacher had required the children in her
class to recite, prior to their morning snack, a verse that read, "We
thank you for the flowers so sweet; We thank you for the food we
eat; We thank you for the birds that sing; We thank you for every-
thing.' 60 Although the verse contained no reference to God, the
court determined that it was a prayer' 6 1 and, therefore, in violation
of the establishment clause. 62 Another example is Stein v. Oshin-
sky163 in which a federal court held that even student-initiated
prayers could be prohibited by local school authorities. In Stein,
the prayer had the same content as the verse challenged in De-
Spain, except that the last line contained a direct address to
"God.164 The recitation of the verse in Stein, however, occurred
not at the direction of the classroom teacher or any other school
authority, but from the initiative of the students themselves. In
response to the recitation, the school principal "ordered his teach-
ers who were instructing the kindergarten classes to stop the in-
fant children from reciting the simple and ancient prayer.' 65 The
court ruled that "[t] he authorities acted well within their powers
154. Id. at 224.
155. This proposal is not without precedent. For example, "[t] he people drank the
eighteenth amendment out of the Constitution." Hanft, The Prayer Deci-
sions, 42 N.C. L REV. 567, 594 (1964).
156. Id. at 597.
157. Pfeffer, Court, Constitution and Prayer, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 735, 735 (1962).
158. See, e.g., Rice, Let Us Pray-An Amendment to the Constitution, 10 CATH.
LAW. 178 (1964); Rice, The Prayer Amendment: A Justification, 24 S.C. L. REv.
705 (1972).
159. 384 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968).
160. Id. at 837.
161. Id. This determination was based on a variety of factors: e.g., (1) for several
years prior to the school year in question, this kindergarten teacher required
her students to recite a verse identical to the one being challenged except
that the last line read, "We thank you, God, for everything;" and (2) expert
testimony that the intent of the verse was to offer thanks to God and that the
pronoun "you" was "obviously addressed to someone who is thought to pro-
vide everything,... [which] is a common definition of God." Id. at 837-38.
162. Id. at 840.
163. 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965).




in concluding that plaintiffs must content themselves with having
their children say these prayers before nine or after three."1 66 The
court then added that "[a]fter all that the states have been told
about keeping the 'wall between church and state . . . high and
impregnable,'... it would be rather bitter irony to chastise New
York for having built the wall too tall and too strong.' 67
2. Moment of Silence
At first blush, prayer appears to have absolutely no place in the
public schools. Upon closer examination, however, the possibility
exists for having a reasonable accommodation of prayer in the
classroom, while maintaining at the same time a high degree of
separation between religion and government. This possibility is
founded upon the case of Gaines v. Anderson168 which involved a
statutorily prescribed moment of silence at the beginning of each
public school day to be used for the purpose of meditation or
prayer.169 Pursuant to this statute, a local school authority
adopted a resolution and guidelines for conducting the moment of
silence. 170 The guidelines contemplated that a teacher would su-
166. Id. at 1002.
167. Id.
168. 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976).
169. At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all
public schools the teacher in charge of the room in which each such
class is held shall announce that a period of silence not to exceed one
minute in duration shall be observed for meditation or prayer, and
during any such period silence shall be maintained and no activities
engaged in.
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71, § IA (West Supp. 1969).
170. The guidelines adopted by the local school authority Kead in full:
1) The following announcement shall be made each school day
morning in each school at the commencement of the first class (it
being understood that in the high schools the home room period
would be considered the first regular period of the day) by the
teacher in charge of the room. The announcement shall be made
during the period of time when school attendance is taken.
'A one minute period of silence for the purpose of meditation or
prayer shall now be observed. During this period silence shall be
maintained and no activities engaged in.' At the end of the one
minute period, the following shall be announced by the teacher.
'Thank you.'
2) If teachers are asked questions concerning this period for medi-
tation or prayer the following should be the response.
'We are doing this in compliance with State Law. Any other ques-
tions you have should be discussed with your parents or with
someone in your home.'
3) Students not adhering to this regulation shall be reminded by
the teacher of their responsibility to obey school rules and regula-
tions. This should be done without detailed explanations or correc-
tive action by the teacher.
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pervise and enforce the moment of silence.171 To assure coopera-
tion, the guidelines directed that persistent violators of the silence
be referred to the school principal. If cooperation did not ensue,
established procedures for dealing with breaches of school regula-
tions were to be followed.172 The court held that the moment of
silence was constitutionally appropriate based on the finding that
the practice as instituted and enforced by state authorities did not
advance or inhibit religion, did not coerce any student to partici-
pate in any activity which infringed upon his liberty of conscience,
did not interfere with the free exercise of any student's religion,
and did not constitute a religious exercise. 173 This holding was
foreshadowed by Mr. Justice Brennan when he wrote:
It has not been shown that.., the observance of a moment of reverent
silence at the opening of class, may not adequately serve. . . [a] solely
secular purpose.. . without jeopardizing either the religious liberties of
any members of the community or the proper degree of separation be-
tween the spheres of religion and government.1 7 4
In analyzing the moment of silence under the establishment
clause, the Gaines court examined the purpose and effect of the
moment of silence. Particularly important in the analysis was the
statutory language requiring that moments of silence be "observed
for meditation or prayer."' 75 The court found that the word "medi-
tation" did not infuse the statute with an unconstitutional purpose
because the act of meditating is not necessarily a religious exer-
4) If a student persists in violating this regulation, the teacher shall
refer the student to the principal for corrective action.
5) The principal shall attempt to gain the cooperation of the student
in obeying this regulation. If reasonable action on the part of the
principal fails to achieve compliance with the regulation, the prin-
cipal will continue to follow normal established procedures for
dealing with breaches of school regulations. These will include a
conference or conferences with parents or guardian of the student
and, in those situations judged necessary by the principal, suspen-
sion of the student from school. The student and his parents or
guardian shall be advised of their right to appeal the decision of the
principal to the Superintendent of Schools or the School Commit-
tee.
421 F. Supp. at 340 n.4.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 340. Accord, Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48, 56 (W.D. Mich. 1965)
(The court stated that a period of silence before lunch would afford each stu-
dent "an opportunity to say their own denominational prayer, and all would
be privileged to say any prayer which their own denomination may have
taught them. Those who do not share the prayer would be free to contem-
plate anything they desired."); Opinion of the Justices, 228 A.2d 161, 162 (N.H.
1967).
174. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 281 (1963) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (emphasis added).
175. MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 71, § 1A (West Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
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cise:176 meditation involves only the "serious reflection or contem-
plation on a subject which may be religious, irreligious or non-
religious.' u7 7 Therefore, the court reasoned that the moment of si-
lence would be unconstitutional only if the moment of silence had
the primary purpose or effect of encouraging the activity of
prayer. 7 8
The court found that the practice did not have the purpose or
effect of encouraging prayer for two reasons. First, the court found
that the statute was designed to be religiously neutral: to accom-
modate, rather than promote, religion in public schools. 7 9 The
statute did not mandate that the students pray, nor did it even
mandate that the students meditate;180 instead, it maintained neu-
176. 421 F. Supp. at 342. But see Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (the
court indicated that while the voluntary practice of the transcendental medi-
tation technique in schools "might be defended.., as primarily a relaxation
or concentration technique with no ultimate significance," id. at 213, it found
transcendental meditation to be "a constitutionally protected religion," id. at
214, and hence the practice was violative of the establishment clause).
Malnak and other cases subsequent to Gaines suggest that courts are now
inclined to take a very broad view of what constitutes establishment of reli-
gion. Id. at 207-13.
177. 421 F. Supp. at 342. The court cited the following definition of "meditation"
given in WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 1403 (unabr. ed.
1966):
1: a spoken or written discourse treated in a contemplative manner
and intended to express its author's reflection or esp. when religious
to guide others in contemplation
2: a private devotion or spiritual exercise consisting in deep contin-
ued reflection on a religious theme...
3: the act of meditating: steady or close consecutive reflection: contin-
ued application of the mind.
421 F. Supp. at 342 n.6.
178. Id. at 343. The court cited the following definition of "prayer" given in WEB-
STER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIMoNARY 1782 (unabr. ed. 1966):
1a: a solemn and humble approach to Divinity in word or thought
usu. involving beseeching, petition, confession, praise, or
thanksgiving... b: an earnest request to someone or for something
2: the act or practice of praying- the addressing of words or thought to
Divinity in petition, confession, praise, or thanksgiving... 3: a reli-
gious service consisting chiefly of prayers ... 4. a set form of words
used in praying: a formula of supplication, confession, praise, or
thanksgiving addressed to God or an object of worship... 5: some-
thing prayed for- a subject of prayer... 6: a slight or minimal chance
(as to succeed or survive).
421 F. Supp. at 343 n.8. The plaintiffs introduced affidavits of experts that the
terms "prayer" and "meditation" are synonymous in certain faiths, but the
court ruled that "[t] his understanding ... is not binding on either the state
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trality in that it compelled only silence.181 Moreover, when ques-
tions regarding the moment of silence arose from the students, the
guidelines maintained neutrality in directing the teachers to re-
spond with the specific statement that: "We are doing this in com-
pliance with State Law. Any other questions you have should be
discussed with your parents or with someone in your home."' 82
Furthermore, the court determined from legislative history that
the legislature had been sensitive to the requirements of religious
neutrality in enacting the moment of silence statute. 183 Second,
the court found that the moment of silence can serve legitimate
secular purposes in the education of students. For example, the
moment of silence at the beginning of the school day "would tend
to still the tumult of the playground and start a day of study."' 84
The court, therefore found that the mere provision of an opportu-
nity for prayer to students desiring to pray did not render the mo-
ment of silence unconstitutional. 185 Thus, the requirements of the
establishment clause were met.
The court also found that the mandates of the free exercise
clause were met. In reaching this conclusion, the court pointed to
the following factors: (1) no student was compelled to participate
in practices violating religious beliefs regarding prayer; (2) no stu-
dent was compelled to participate in religious exercises violating
liberty of conscience; (3) no student was confronted with the
choice of participating in a religious exercise or requesting to be
excused from it; (4) a student may reflect silently on a secular
topic or simply remain silent during the moment of silence; and (5)
a student desiring to do so may pray silently during the moment of
silence. 186 The challenged practice was therefore acceptable
under the religion clauses of the Constitution. 87
In light of the negative reaction to the prayer decisions of the
181. Id. at 344.
182. See id. at 340 n.4 (subsection 2) & 344.
183. See id. at 343. The term "prayer" was not in the statute as originally enacted.
The words "or prayer" were added by amendment in 1973. 1973 Mass. Acts,
Ch. 621, at 606 (MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 71, § 14). The original bill propos-
ing the addition of "or prayer" to the statute used the conjunctive "and" so
that the statute would have read, "observed for meditation and prayer."
Mass. House Bill 4890 (1973) (emphasis added). The sponsor of the bill later
amended it on the floor by taking out the conjunctive "and" and replacing it
with the disjunctive "or." 421 F. Supp. at 343.
184. Id. at 342 (quoting Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,281 (1963)).
Moreover, the court added that "[t]he legislature could reasonably believe
that students tend to learn greater self-discipline and respect for the author-
ity of the teacher from a required moment of silence." Id.
185. Id. at 344.
186. Id. at 345.
187. Accprd, State Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 108 N.J. Super. 564, 574-75, 262
A.2d 21, 26-27, affd, 57 N.J. 172, 270 A.2d 412 (1970). However, it is impermissi-
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United States Supreme Court, the moment of silence seems to be a
reasonable and acceptable means of accommodating religion in
the public schools. Certainly, the moment of silence could be uti-
lized as a direct substitute for the "opening exercise" practices
struck down in Engel' 88 and Abington.189 Heretofore, the moment
of silence has not been widely utilized. Of the 206 responses to the
survey of Nebraska public school superintendents, 190 only two su-
perintendents indicated that their school systems provided for a
moment of silence on a regular basis. 19 1
3. Graduation Prayers
Despite of the rather strict prohibition against prayers in public
schools, a number of courts have upheld the use of invocations and
benedictions in public school graduation ceremonies. 92 These
have been sanctioned in spite of the fact that the invocations and
benedictions were found to clearly constitute prayers, 193 and that
these prayers were uttered as a part of an official public school
function. In analyzing the situation under the free exercise clause,
the voluntary nature of attendance at the graduation ceremony has
been emphasized. 194 The cases involved situations in which no
pressures to attend the graduation ceremony were placed upon the
students. 195 In Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township School District,19 6
for example, the court found that all compulsory instruction, ex-
ble for the school to provide students with religious materials upon which to
meditate. Id.
188. 374 U.S. at 206-07.
189. 370 U.S. at 422.
190. See note 12 & accompanying text supra.
191. The question inquiring about the moment of silence reads as follows:
Does your school system provide on a regular basis for a moment of
silence which may be used by the students for meditation or prayer?
a. Yes
b. No.
192. See Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Va. 1974); Wood v. Mt. Leb-
anon Township School Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Wiest v. Mt.
Lebanon School Dist., 457 Pa. 166, 320 A.2d 362 (1974).
193. See Grossberg v. Deusbebio, 380 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D. Va. 1974). See also
Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon Township School Dist., 457 Pa. 166, 176, 320 A.2d 362, 368
(1974) (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
194. See Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285, 290 (E.D. Va. 1974); Wood v. Mt.
Lebanon Township School Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1293, 1294 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Wiest
v. Mt. Lebanon Township School Dist., 457 Pa. 166, 171, 320 A.2d 362, 364-65
(1974). It should be noted that, although voluntariness has frequently been
declared to be irrelevant in evaluating facts under the establishment clause,
see, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963), volun-
tariness speaks directly to the issue of coercion under the free exercise
clause, see Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963); En-
gel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
195. In Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon Township School Dist., 457 Pa. 166, 169, 320 A.2d 362,
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aminations, and training were completed before the graduation
ceremony and that it stood completely apart from all formal re-
quirements for graduation. 9 7 Indeed, a student not attending the
ceremony would nevertheless receive a diploma as well as all
other rights and privileges bestowed upon those who did attend. 9 8
In spite of this lack of objective coercion, the Grossberg v.
Deusebio'9 9 court recognized that certain subjective, indirect pres-
sures to attend existed. 200 But these pressures did not invalidate
the invocation and benediction under the free exercise clause be-
cause "[w] hile there are indirect pressures to attend, there are no
substantial demands to partake. '201 In support of this finding, the
court pointed to the facts that no audience recitation of a prayer
was involved and that each student's mind could be turned to mat-
ters of the student's own choosing during the invocation and bene-
diction.20 2 The court conceded that the invocation and benediction
might cause offense to some, but found that such an offense would
not inhibit the practice and pursuit of individual religious beliefs.
Therefore, it concluded that: "While an acute fastidiousness might
and indeed does give one pause, the Court is not convinced that
the primary effect of the invocation will be either doctrinal dissem-
ination or a manifestation of governmental affinity for religion.
Such substance is rarely the result of high school graduation exer-
cises."20 3
The court found the invocation and benediction matter to be a
close question under the establishment clause.20 4 In arriving at
the conclusion that the establishment clause was not violated, the
court pointed to the fact that prayers and other references to God
are not absolutely prohibited in public life.205 Among the constitu-
tionally acceptable references to God in public life, according to
Mr. Justice Douglas, are prayers in legislative halls, appeals to God
in presidential speeches, and other references to God in our na-
364 (1974), however, the court found that graduation ceremonies were usually
attended by more than 90% of the graduating class.
196. 342 F. Supp. 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
197. Id. at 1294.
198. Id.
199. 380 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Va. 1974).




204. See Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285, 290 (E.D. Va. 1974); Wood v. Mt.
Lebanon Township School Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1293, 1295 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
205. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952); Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F.
Supp. 285, 289 (E.D. Va. 1974); Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon Township School Dist.,
457 Pa. 166, 172-73, 320 A.2d 362, 365 (1974).
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tional life.206 Upon examining the graduation exercises, the court
found their purpose to be ceremonial-indeed, "just such a public
ritual or ceremony which Mr. Justice Douglas may have had in
mind. '207 The Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township School District208
court, for example, explained that "graduation ceremonies at Mt.
Lebanon Township School District are just that-i.e., they are cer-
emonial and are in fact not a part of the formal, day-to-day routine
of the school curriculum to which is attached compulsory attend-
ance. '209 The purpose of thegraduation exercise was to ceremoni-
ously award honors and diplomas, and all other factors of the
program were peripheral to the ceremonial function.210
Beyond the ritual or ceremonial justification for the invocation
and benediction under the establishment clause was the fact that
any expenditure of public monies connected with the challenged
invocations and benedictions was de minimus so that no monetary
harm occurred to anyone because of the prayers.211 Moreover, the
time taken up by prayer was minimal,212 no element of calculated
indoctrination existed,213 no governmental stamp of approval was
placed on the prayers,214 the practice had no repetitive charac-
ter,215 and no danger existed of government becoming embroiled in
a divisive religious battle for control of invocations and benedic-
tions.216 'The event, in short, [was] so fleeting that no significant
transfer of government prestige can be anticipated. '217
The decisions upholding the use of invocations and benedic-
tions at graduation exercises may appear to stand at variance with
Engel,218 Abington,219 and their progeny which strictly prohibit
oral prayers in the public school context. 220 The primary basis for
206. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952).
207. Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon Township School Dist., 457 Pa. 166, 173, 320 A.2d 362, 366
(1974). See also Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township School Dist., 342 F. Supp.
1293, 1294 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285, 288-89
(E.D. Va. 1974).
208. 342 F. Supp. 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
209. Id. at 1294.
210. Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township School Dist., 342 F. Supp. at 1295. See also
Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285,289 (E.D. Va. 1974).
211. 342 F. Supp. at 1295.
212. Id.; Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285, 288-89 (E.D. Va. 1974).
213. Id. at 288.
214. 342 F. Supp. at 1294.
215. 380 F. Supp. at 288-89.
216. Id. at 289.
217. Id.
218. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
219. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
220. Compare Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Va. 1974); Wood v. Mt.
Lebanon Township School Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Wiest v.
Mt. Lebanon Township School Dist., 457 Pa. 166, 320 A.2d 362 (1974); with
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this deviation from the strict prohibition is found in the fact that
the graduation ceremony is too remote from the classroom or any
educational program to be constitutionally impermissible.22 1 The
graduation ceremony, therefore, loses the special emphasis on the
separation values that clothe the public education context.222 The
graduation ceremony is more like a situation in the mature, adult
world than a situation in the immature and impressionable world
of the child.223
The invocation and benediction at graduation ceremonies,
therefore, provide an acceptable means by which a public school
system may accommodate religion.
Responses to the survey of Nebraska public school superin-
tendents224 indicate that the graduation invocation and/or bene-
diction is frequently utilized as a means of accommodating religion
in Nebraska schools. Of the 206 responses to the survey, all but
three superintendents indicated that an invocation and/or bene-
diction was part of the graduation ceremony.
B. Student Meetings
Suppose a group of students at a public high school were to re-
quest use of a school room for religious purposes (e.g., for Bible
study). Assume also that the request would involve weekly uses
lasting approximately fifteen minutes each. May the request be
granted by the local high school authorities? The answer is far
from settled because state and lower federal courts have reached
conflicting decisions, and the United States Supreme Court has
not yet addressed the issue. The different policies in various
school systems reflect the unsettled law. Of the 206 responses to
the survey of Nebraska public school superintendents,225 ninety-
seven indicated that a request similar to that posed in the hypo-
thetical would not be granted, ninety-seven indicated that it could
be granted, and the remainder either indicated that they did not
Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (voluntary practice of mental tech-
nique prohibited); Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965) (student-initi-
ated prayers prohibited); State Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 108 N.J .Super.
564, 262 A.2d 21, aff'd, 57 N.J. 172, 270 A.2d 412 (1970) (remarks of chaplain in
United States Congress banned in public school).
221. Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285, 288-89 (E.D. Va. 1974); Wood v. Mt.
Lebanon Township School Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1293, 1294-95 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
222. For a discussion of this special separation emphasis, see notes 8-10 & accom-
panying text supra.
223. Note the similarities between the graduation cases and Lincoln v. Page, 109
N.H. 30, 241 A.2d 799 (1968) (invocation by clergyman at opening of town
meeting upheld). See note 220 supra.




know or they did not respond to the question.226
Reed v. Van Hoven 227 held that a request similar to the hypo-
thetical request could be granted as an appropriate accommoda-
tion of religion. In Van Hoven, the court established specific
guidelines that must govern the granting of the request.228 The
guidelines are: (1) the use of the room must occur at least five min-
utes before the start of or at least five minutes after the completion
of the regularly scheduled class day;229 (2) no bell should ring to
signify the start of the meetings;230 (3) the transition from the reli-
gious use of the facilities to the regular school day (or vice versa)
must involve "a general commingling of the entire student body on
the way to [or from] class, just as there would be were there no
* . . [religious use] whatever.... [so that] home rooms . .. will
be filled in the usual way, and no student will enter a room con-
taining a group which has previously congregated there for the
purpose prayer '23 1 (4) the role of the teacher during the meetings
must be strictly that of one charged with the responsibility of
maintaining order;232 and (5) the room used must not be the regu-
226. The question eliciting this information reads as follows:
If a group of your students would ask to meet periodically in a school
room for religious purposes and would agree to use the school room
prior to or immediately following the school day, would your school
system grant this request?
Yes
No.
227. 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965).
228. The plan [established by the court] is an attempted accommodation
[of religion], and since it is an accommodation, it must in no way
affect those who do not wish an accommodation. For this reason, the
practices which are observed must be free of any possible elements
of coercion. Those who do take the opportunity to participate in the
program must be separated from the official activity of the school, as
of course must be the program itself.
Id. at 54.
229. Id.
Requiring that the use occur either before or after the regularly
scheduled school day separates the use from official school activity.
The five minute intervals were added to insure this separation. The
intervals also prevent the use from affecting in any way those who do
not wish such an accommodation of religion and thereby frees the
use from any possible elements of coercion.
Id.
230. Id. The basis for this guideline is that the use "is voluntary, and those wish-
ing to avail themselves of the opportunity provided should learn the time
when it is offered to them and appear at the designated location without the
aid of a school bell." Id.
231. Id. at 54-55.
232. Id. at 56. For example:
No teacher shall be called upon to select the prayer which should be
said, or to select the readings which may be given. The students
would determine, by means of their own choosing, what should be
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lar home room of the students attending the religious use.233 Van
Hoven is strongly supported by the argument that the constitu-
tional freedoms of religion, expression, association, equal protec-
tion, and a public forum require the granting of the request and
that the grant does not violate the establishment clause.2 4
A few state court cases, however, have held that granting stu-
dent requests to use school rooms for religious purposes is a viola-
tion of the establishment clause. For example, in Trietley v. Board
of Education of Buffalo,235 six high school students, with their par-
ents and members of the clergy, requested permission from the
Buffalo Board of Education to use public school rooms for Bible
club meetings. The request included proposed guidelines that
were consistent with those established in Van Hoven.236 In deal-
ing with the constitutional issues, the court ruled that "the pro-
posed activities would go beyond merely accommodating the
religious interests of petitioners and would transgress the princi-
ples of governmental neutrality expressed in the establishment
clause of the first amendment. 237 This establishment clause rul-
ing was based upon findings that (1) the purpose of the proposed
use was religious in nature, (2) the primary effect of the proposed
done in this respect. The burden would not be cast upon the teacher
to make the decision, nor to stand up and be counted.
Id.
233. Id. at 54.
234. For a thorough presentation of this argument, see Toms & Whitehead, The
Religious Student in Public Education" Resolving a Constitutional Dilemma,
27 EMORY L.J. 3 (1978).
235. 65 A.D.2d 1, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1978).
236. These guidelines provided:
each club must choose as officers, a bible reading chairman, a record-
ing secretary and a memory verse chairman; that club membership
must be voluntary and each club and meeting must be led by stu-
dents, with no meeting dominated by any one person; that the clubs
must have at least one teacher volunteer as an advisor who would
attend and supervise meetings; that each club must be interdenomi-
national; that meetings must be conducted before or after the official
school class day for no longer than 15 minutes, in a place which
would not interfere with the conduct of normal school activities; that
the meetings would not be for socializing or the discussion of
churches or church doctrines; and that each club 'must be an asset to
the school, providing moral and spiritual assistance to the students.'
... that the proposed clubs would follow criteria established for
other clubs or student organizations presently existing in the Buffalo
public high schools and would adhere to other reasonable require-
ments imposed by the Buffalo Board of Education or Superintendent
of Schools.
Id. at 4, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
237. Id. at 8, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 917. Accord, Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union
High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877
(1977); Commissioner of Educ. v. School Comm., 358 Mass. 776,267 N.E.2d 226,
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 849 (1971).
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use was to advance a religious philosophy contained in the Bible,
(3) state financial support would flow directly to the club members
in the form of rent free use of public facilities, heat, lighting and
other connected expenses, and (4) public school employees would
have to supervise the use.238 Regarding the free exercise clause,
the court held there was no violation because no state coercion
was involved: "Here petitioners are free to pursue their religious
beliefs; they are only prevented from enlisting the aid of the public
school system to do so.''239
Public school authorities who want to grant the request are
placed in a difficult position by the unsettled state of the law. Nev-
ertheless, three alternative courses of action appear to be available
for accommodating religion in this situation. The first is to simply
grant the request subject to the limitations established in Van
Hoven and with the understanding that a number of courts have
refused to grant similar requests. 240 The advisability of pursuing
the first alternative is, therefore, dependent upon the existence of
any significant opposition in the community.
The second alternative is to grant the request subject to the Van
Hoven limitations but only if students pay a rental fee for the use
of school facilities. According to the survey of Nebraska public
school superintendents, 24 1 a number of Nebraska schools have a
policy of following this rental alternative.242 The benefit of a rental
fee is that it would satisfy much of the objection expressed in the
cases prohibiting religious use of school facilities by students. 243
Moreover, a rental fee would bring the situation within the rule
articulated in Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Board of Edu-
cation.244 Resnick involved the rental of public school facilities by
local churches for religious services and religious education
classes on Sundays. The Court stated:
We hold that religious groups who fully reimburse school boards for relat-
238. 65 A.D.2d at 7-8, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 916-17.
239. Id.
240. Van Hoven has not been followed in New York, Massachusetts, or California.
Trietly v. Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1978); Commissioner
of Educ. v. School Comm., 358 Mass. 776, 267 N.E.2d 226, cert. denied, 404 U.S.
849 (1971); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).
241. See note 12 & accompanying text supra.
242. Although the questionnaire did not specifically request this information, six
superintendents specified on the questionnaire form that their schools would
follow the rental alternative.
243. See Trietly v. Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 8, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912, 916 (1978); John-
son v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 12 137
Cal. Rptr. 43, 49, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).
244. 77 N.J. 88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978). Accord, State ex rel. Gilbert v. Dilleys, 95 Neb.
527, 145 N.W.2d 999 (1914).
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ed out-of-pocket expenses may use school facilities on a temporary basis
for religious services as well as educational classes. We further hold that
the courts below erred in requiring these sectarian groups to pay a com-
mercial rental rate and in placing the one-year limitation on their contin-
ued use of the school premises. 24
5
The only significant difference in the Resnick situation and a stu-
dent use would be the school supervision involved in the latter.
This difference, however, could be eliminated by having an adult
not connected with the school system voluntarily supervise the
use,24 6 or by allowing the students to simply use the room without
supervision subject to revocation.
A third alternative is for the school authorities to deny the re-
quest but then assist the students in contacting clergy, parents,
and appropriate community groups for the purpose of finding an
alternative facility for the students to use. Authority for such
assistance is found in Zorach v. Clausen,247 which upheld a "re-
leased time" program for the religious education of public school
students. The Zorach Court stated that it is constitutionally ap-
propriate when a teacher:
cooperates in a religious program to the extent of making it possible for
her students to participate in it. Whether she does it occasionally for a
few students, regularly for one, or pursuant to a systematized program
designed to further the religious needs of all the students does not alter
the [constitutionally appropriate] character of the act.248
In light of these three alternatives, there is no need to deprive
the requesting students of the opportunity for worship. Indeed, a
flat denial of their request, without at least pursuing the third al-
ternative, might be seen as an unacceptable demonstration of hos-
tility toward religion.
Concerning the substance of religious discussion or prayers oc-
curring during the religious use, the school authorities should
avoid regulatory involvement. Requirements that the religious
character of the use be nondenominational or nonsectarian, for ex-
ample, would be inappropriate. The United States Supreme Court
ruled in Engel v. Vitale that it is no part of the business of govern-
ment to compose official prayers or to control, support, or influence
245. 77 N.J. at 120, 389 A.2d at 960 (emphasis added). In analyzing earlier cases the
court noted: "While there is a split among jurisdictions as to whether it is
constitutionally permissible for public school premises to be used for reli-
gious purposes ... the only case within the last 35 years which addressed the
federal constitutional issue upheld the use." 77 N.J. at 106, 389 A.2d at 952-53
(citing Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1148, § 4 at 1163 (1961) (Schools-Use for Religious
Purposes)). The single case referred to was Southside Estates Baptist
Church v. Board of Trustees, 115 So.2d 697 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1959).
246. The adult involved should take a strictly supervisory role and not enter into
the religious activity. See note 232 & accompanying text supra.
247. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
248. Id. at 313.
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the kinds of prayers the American people can say.249 Presumably,
such a principle applies to all types of religious discussion as well
as to prayers. Indeed, if a church were to conduct its services at a
public school facility (as in Resnick), it would be preposterous for
state authorities to require that any part of the services be nonde-
nominational or nonsectarian. By the same token, the religious
character of a student use is beyond regulation. Moreover, in Reed
v. Van Hoven the court ruled that a teacher supervising the use
should avoid any control over religious aspects of the use and that
the students alone would be responsible for religious content.250 It
follows that restraint by other school authorities is impermissible
as well. This is not to say that school authorities cannot enforce
order and reasonable decorum, 2 51 but they must be very careful in
any regulation to avoid matters of religious substance. Further-
more, once a forum is established for religious discussion, the
rights of free speech and free exercise place the content and char-
acter of the discussion beyond state regulatory authority. Reli-
gious views and discussions by their nature tend to be dogmatic,
sectarian, and mystical. To require that the use be nondenomina-
tional-e.g., that all prayers be addressed to some neutral being
rather than to "God," "Jehovah," or "Allah," or that all discussion
center on elements common to religions in general-would force a
blandness upon the use that would render it religiously impotent
and worthless.
V. CONCLUSION
The principle of separation between church and state is suf-
ficiently flexible to permit reasonable governmental accommoda-
tions of religion. The means for accommodating religion examined
in this comment are significant in that they enable public school
students to receive a liberal education-" [O Ine can hardly respect
a system of education that would leave the student wholly ignorant
of the currents of religious thought that move the world society for
a part in which he is being prepared" 252-- and to freely exercise
their religion.253 More importantly, accommodating religion in
public schools has the effect of showing respect for the religious
nature of our people.25 4 Great care must be exercised by school
authorities to assure that an appropriate level of accommodation
249. 370 U.S. at 428, 429.
250. 237 F. Supp. at 56.
251. See note 36 & accompanying text supra.
252. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
253. Id. at 211-12; Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
254. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
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exists.255
To be sure, the entanglement of religion and government is un-
acceptable, but a callous indifference on the part of government
toward religion is equally unacceptable:256
It is a fallacy to suppose that by omitting a subject you teach nothing
about it. On the contrary you teach that it is to be omitted, and that it is
therefore a matter of secondary importance. And you teach this not
openly and explicitly, which would invite criticism; you simply take it for
granted and thereby insinuate it silently, insidiously, and all but irresist-
ably.257
It is only appropriate, therefore, that public schools recognize and
reflect the fact that religion and the American experience are inex-
tricably intertwined.
Donald L. Swanson '80
255. In some cases, this may mean lessening the degree of the school's involve-
ment with religion. The survey of Nebraska Public School Superintendents,
see note 12 & accompanying text supra, contained a question about the local
community's opinion. This question read in full "[w]ith your answers to the
above questions in mind, would the majority of citizens in your community
like to have (a greater, a lesser, or about the same) degree of accommodation
of religious practices in your school system?" Forty of the 206 responding
superintendents indicated that the citizens of their respective communities
would like to have a greater degree of religious accommodation in their pub-
lic school systems. No response indicated that the community would like to
have a lesser degree of accommodation.
256. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
257. Sm W. MOBERLY, THE CRISIS IN THE UNIVERsrrY 56 (London 1949) (quoted in
0. ZABEL, supra note 25).
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